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1. Introduction
Animal protection as an emerging field of legislation needs to be constitutionalized as 
well as comprehensively expounded by legal scholars. As it is a growing body of regula­
tion and concomitant legal theories, it needs to develop a solid conceptual and axiologi­
cal framework, in particular a set of basic values and principles on which detailed rules 
are to be founded. Lacking these, the domain of animal law is still in the pre-paradigm 
stage and remains an assemblage of dispersed ideas, concepts and regulatory measures. 
It yet has to develop into a coherent whole that may grow to be a mature regulatory 
and doctrinal domain of law. In order to reach this stage, it should be founded on 
clear theoretical and constitutional grounds. Lacking those, its further development 
and effective operation may be seriously impeded.
There seem to be two basic approaches that may serve as the possible foundations 
for a viable model of animal protection law. The first may be referred to as the “dignity” 
approach and the other, as the “sentientist” approach. According to the first of those 
two approaches, animal protection law should rely on the concept of animal dignity 
as its philosophical foundation. Animals are to be treated with appreciation for their 
inherent dignity which the law ought to recognize and respect. Switzerland was the 
first country to apply the concept of dignity in respect of non­human creatures, albeit it 
happened partially as a side-effect of expanding the concept of dignity to respond to the 
challenges of genetic engineering.3 Nonetheless, since then it has gradually become 
the cornerstone of Swiss animal protection law, in particular after the revised Animal 
Welfare Act (German: Tierschutzgesetz) declared in its opening article that the aim of 
1 ORCID number: 0000­0003­0428­7021. E­mail: tomasz.pietrzykowski@us.edu.pl
2 The paper has been prepared thanks to the funding granted by the National Science Center (research grant no. 
2017/27/B/HS5/00085). 
3 See more on that origin in S. Stucki, Grundrechte für Tiere [Eng. Fundamental Rights for Animals], Baden­Baden 
2016, p. 92ff; Ch. Ammann, B. Christensen, L. Engi, M. Margot (eds.), Würde der Kreatur. Ethische und rechtliche 
Beiträge zu einem umstrittenen Konzept [Eng. Dignity of Living Beings. Ethical and Legal Essays on a Contested Concept], 
Zürich 2015.
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its provisions is to protect “the dignity and welfare of animals”.4 Since then, a similar 
path has been followed by Liechtenstein where the same wording was incorporated into 
its Animal Welfare Law (German: Tierschutzgesetz).5
The second approach rejects the idea of animal dignity as a defensible basis of the 
relevant legislation on the grounds of it being philosophically dubious and entailing 
objectionable normative consequences for the scope and content of the legal protection 
of animals. Thus, it rather aims at founding legal norms and policies directly on sci­
entifically informed theories of sentience, evolutionarily developed nervous structures 
underlying cognitive and emotional capabilities or species­typical biological and psycho­
logical needs that condition the subjective well-being of a given creature. It postulates 
that the legal situation of animals ought to be regulated directly based on empirical 
evidence provided by science and its ethically sound implications without deploying the 
concept of “animal dignity” which may prove more troublesome and misleading than 
contributive to rational law­ and policymaking.
The aim of this paper is to analyse and discuss both these approaches and to argue 
that the former is philosophically, conceptually and practically flawed. The second 
approach, even despite some serious disadvantages, is therefore deemed to be prefer­
able and more promising.
2. The dignity approach
The contemporary concept of human dignity is rooted in the religious tradition of man as 
a creature endowed with an immortal soul and thus elevated above all other entities.6 Its 
secular version is rooted in the modern rationalistic thought that stems from 17th century 
humanist philosophy. Its most prominent expression was the Kantian idea of reason as 
the condition of the moral standing of human beings and their status as ends in them­
selves (as opposed to other beings which were held to be of merely instrumental value).
Human dignity so conceived is the cornerstone of the modern human rights ide­
ology. It is regarded as the source and foundation of human rights. In virtue of his or 
her dignity, every human being deserves recognition and respect for its basic personal 
entitlements. Thus, dignity as an attribute of human beings serves to distinguish people 
from all other kinds of creatures and even from human beings as persons before the 
law.7 Despite all individual differences, each and every human person is believed to be 
ultimately equal in her or his dignity and to deserve some elementary level of legal recog ­ 
nition as an individual being. According to this ideology, even if there are other goods 
worthy of legal protection, they are instrumental and subordinate to the fundamental 
value of human dignity, which is absolute and impervious to any balancing.
Having played such a key role for the contemporary conceptions of personhood and 
rights, the idea of dignity has become a natural stepping stone to theories advocating 
fundamental changes in the legal approach to non­human animals. Science has been 
providing ever more discoveries about the complexities of animal minds. The revealed 
evolutionary continuity in cognitive and emotional capacities across species is turning 
4 Animal Welfare Act of 2005 (German title: Tierschutzgesetz), 16.12.2005 (AS 2008 2965).
5 Animal Welfare Act of 2010 (German title: Tierschutzgesetz), 23.09.2010 (LGBl 455.333).
6 See e.g.: M. Rosen, Dignity. Its History and Meaning, Cambridge (Mass.) 2012.
7 For more detailed examination of this issue see: T. Pietrzykowski, Personhood Beyond Humanism. Animals, 
Autonomous Agents and the Law, Cham 2018, p. 27ff. 
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the alleged gap between human and non­human animals into an obsolete superstition.8 
Therefore, it seems natural to seek a solution to the problem of inadequate treatment 
of animals by extending the concept of dignity onto at least some non­human species. 
Their too long overlooked or ignored moral similarities to human beings should be 
reflected in the likeness of their recognition and protection under the law. The claims 
that some animals, such as chimpanzees, dolphins or elephants, should be granted 
the status of persons in law implies that the underpinning concept of dignity needs 
to be extended beyond the narrow boundaries of one species only.9 There are powerful 
scientific and ethical reasons to close the legal gap that has been sustained between 
human beings as persons in law and non­human creatures as mere objects of property. 
The consequence of the legal personification of animals is believed to lead to direct 
outlawing and abolition of horrible and immoral practices of exploitation.10
3. Dignity in the modern legal discourse
Though the idea of dignity plays a key role in the modern constitutional discourse, it 
is hardly defined as a term of legal language. It is rather conceived as a philosophical 
or moral notion underpinning the central status of a human being in a legal system. 
It is dignity that explains why each and every human being irrespective of individual 
differences should be regarded as a person in law and deserves basic human rights. In 
this sense, dignity functions in the legal discourse as an intermediate concept, basically 
bridging the domains of what is (sein) and what ought to be (sollen). The sole fact of 
being born as a human being “endows” one with dignity. Then, as a creature having 
their own dignity, he or she ought to be treated in a certain way. In other words, mem­
bership in the human species confers dignity on a creature, which in turn implies certain 
normative consequences.
Arguably, the dignity so conceived is one of the most spectacular examples of what 
Alf Ross once famously exposed as Tû-Tû.11 It does not have to denote anything real, 
since its role in practical discourse (and set of beliefs) is just to link certain facts with 
some attributed behaviours regarded as their normative implications. The main aim of 
Ross’s attack was to strip the legal language of metaphysical concepts that do not refer 
to anything actually existing but still operate in practice solely through the shared beliefs 
and intellectual constructions of their users whose actions constitute the social reality of 
law. The concepts that were the main target of the realist’s attack included legal notions 
such as “norm”, “right”, “obligation”, “binding force”, “validity”, “derogation” and the 
like. It still continues to be debated whether all non­factual terms in the legal language 
8 See e.g.: D. Griffin, Animal Minds, Beyond Cognition to Consciousness, Chicago 2001; G. Roth, The Long Evolution 
of Brains and Minds, Dordrecht 2013; S. Wise, Drawing the Line. Science and the Case for Animal Rights, Cambridge 
(Mass.) 2002.
9 See: S. Wise, Drawing…; G. Francione, Animals as Persons. Essays in the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, New York 2008. 
10 The most radical stance linking animal personification with immediate abolition of their exploitation is advocated 
by Gary Francione (G. Francione, Animals..., p. 23). Saskia Stucki argues that the status of a person entails basic 
rights to the respect of one’s dignity, life, liberty and integrity, ruling out most existing ways of exploitation (S. Stucki, 
Grundrechte..., p. 365ff). Also for Steven Wise, the concepts of autonomy, personhood, and respect for the basic 
dignity-rights are intimately connected – see: S. Wise, Rattling the Cage. Toward Legal Rights for Animals, Cambridge 
(Mass.) 2000, p. 243ff. For a criticism of limiting the implications of granting personhood to “basic” rights only see: 
O. Le Bot, Introduction au droit de l’animal [Eng. Introduction to Animal Rights], Paris 2018, p. 127ff. 
11 A. Ross, “Tû-Tû”, “Harvard Law Review” 1957/70, p. 812ff. 
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may be regarded as purely “intermediate”, tû-tû concepts.12 It seems, however, that if 
Ross’s analysis was correct in respect of many legal concepts, it appears to be correct 
for the concept of dignity too.
It is not difficult to observe that the way the concept of dignity is used in the legal 
discourse is as if it actually referred to a certain quality possessed by creatures that are 
thought to be endowed with it. It is believed to explain and justify why they occupy a cer­
tain moral status, which, in turn, entails their inherent right to be recognized as legal 
persons as well. Every bearer of this metaphysical quality is entitled to be recognized as 
a person solely in virtue of this “fact”, irrespective of any actual properties one possesses 
or lacks.13 Moreover, it is treated as the key moral and ontological distinction between 
human and non-human beings as well as a constitutive feature of human personhood. 
It is so fundamental, though, that its meaning and reference is conceived as self­evident 
and unpackable only by philosophical, not legal, investigations. When courts or legal 
scholar undertake to explain the concept of dignity, the outcomes usually demonstrate 
typical ignotum per ignotum or idem per idem ways of thinking.14
4. Why not dignity for animals?
The concept of human dignity has played an unquestionably progressive role in the 
development of modern human rights’ protection. Above all, it helped to overcome the 
most severe inequalities of people before the law. Today, it remains the basic conceptual 
shield against the ideas undermining the equal basic status of all human beings and 
thus helps to prevent the deprivation of many group of people of fundamental legal 
protection.15 Nonetheless, it is so effective mainly thanks to its metaphysical flavour and 
principal vagueness. Due to this nature, it may be used as if it denoted a sort of myste­
rious property giving the human species its ethical and ontological superiority over the 
rest of creation. In this sense it has become a kind of modern and secular spell, turning 
a biological organism into a good in itself as well as an inherent personal rights-holder.16
Therefore, dignity as the source of human rights operates in “all or nothing” fash­
ion. A creature either does or does not have it. Consequently, the relevant set of rights 
either belongs or does not belong to the creature in question. Unless one is a dig-
nity-holder, one does not deserve to be regarded as a good in oneself, whose interests 
matter irrespective of the interests and rights of human persons.17 The artificiality of 
this approach becomes even more clear in view of the progressing technologies that 
make it possible biologically to combine human and non­human organisms (by means 
12 T. Gizbert­Studnicki, M. Klinowski, Are Legal Concepts Embedded in Legal Norms?, “International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law” 2012/25, pp. 553–562; B. Brożek, On “tû-tû”, “Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and 
Philosophy of Law” 2015/27, pp. 15–23.
13 For analyses of the ways in which the concept of dignity is used in various legal contexts see e.g.: S. Riley (ed.), Human 
Dignity and Law: Legal and Philosophical Investigations, New York 2018.
14 Typical explanations refer to the concepts of the inherent or absolute value of a human being, her or his worth, 
autonomy or rationality, personal integrity, source or basis of basic human rights etc. 
15 See e.g.: C. Von Geusau, Human Dignity and the Law in Post-War Europe. The Roots and Reality of the Ambigous 
Concept, Oisterwijk 2013; P. Gilbert, Human Dignity and Human Right, Oxford 2019.
16 Thus, one having an inherent dignity is a perfect example of a “queer” fact in the sense famously discussed and 
criticized in J.L. Mackie, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, London 1977, p. 38ff. 
17 One could object that juristic (corporate) persons are commonly regarded as independent rights-holders. I criticize 
this view elsewhere, arguing that actually corporate personhood is an additional legal devise to let people pursue 
some of their interests in more efficient, organized way. If this is correct then corporate and “natural” personhood 
should not be seen as equivalent. See: T. Pietrzykowski, Personhood…, p. 31ff. 
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of creating chimeras and hybrids).18 At the same time, the on and off nature of dignity 
legally conceived makes it quite inconvenient to improve the legal situation of animals.
4.1. Dignity and equality
The important function of the modern concept of dignity is to make all people equal 
in their basic legal status. Therefore, if it was to be expanded to animals, there would 
be basically two options. Either it would be more or less arbitrarily ascribed to a sub­
-group of animals (e.g. chimpanzees), making them “equal” to human beings in the 
sense of having similar kinds of “dignity” as their foundation.19 All of them would have 
to be a similar kind of “persons” enjoying similar sets of basic personal rights stemming 
from their inherent dignity. Obviously, this group would have to be distinguished on 
the basis of some criteria, sufficient level of cognitive capabilities, practical autonomy, 
evolutionary affinity to humans or the like.
Nonetheless, the outcome of the application of such a criterion would have been, 
again, the split of animals in an on­and­off manner. Some of them would belong to the 
group that, having met the set criteria and deserving ”full” legal protection, is regarded 
as persons having their own dignity. All the other animals would remain outside this 
“expanded circle”. The legal universe would remain ultimately dual, composed of per­
sons and things, yet divided by a line drawn across the non-animal animal kingdom 
rather than between human and non-human animals (as it is the case today). On one 
of the sides of the line would be some “human­like” animals ascribed with dignity, 
while on the other, the remaining “undignified” animals (presumably deprived of any 
inherent value and thus deserving no special moral concern, at least for their own sake).
4.2. Dignity, personhood and agency
Furthermore, the extension of the concept of dignity beyond the boundaries of the 
species would make it difficult to differentiate between human and non­human per­
sonhood. Both of them would have the same axiological foundation in dignity as the 
principal source of rights. These two ”kinds” of legal rights­holders should, however, be 
differentiated due to the gap that unquestionably exists between moral agency (which 
human beings possess) and the status of a moral patient (which would be that of the 
dignified animals).
The juxtaposition of capabilities underlying moral agency and patiency is well­estab­
lished in ethical theory. In animal rights discourse, it has been memorably introduced 
by Tom Regan, for whom moral agency is the possession of abilities allowing for free 
choice and considerate moral action.20 As opposed to that, moral patients lack such an 
ability.21 It is not only animals, but also human infants, and people with serious mental 
or neurological dysfunctions that belong to the category of moral patients rather than 
moral agents. Moral patients do count morally and should be protected from wrongs done 
18 See: J. Taupitz, M. Weschka (eds.), Chimbrids. Chimeras and Hybrids in Comparative European and International 
Research. Scientific, Ethical, Philosophical and Legal Aspects, Dordrecht 2009.
19 An interesting discussion of the levelling quality and conventionality of such distinctions may be found in A. Peters, 
Liberté, Égalité, Animalité. Human-Animal Comparisons in Law, “Transnational Environmental Law” 2016/1, 
pp. 25–53.
20 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley–Los Angeles, p. 151.
21 T. Regan, The Case..., p. 152.
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by others. Moreover, due to their lack of capacities to act in an ethically meaningful way, 
moral patients should also be prevented, whenever necessary, from doing harm to others 
or to themselves, but their actions do not fall within the scope of moral accountability. It is 
a well-established principle of developed legal systems that moral agency is a prerequisite 
of legal responsibility, in particular culpability in criminal law.22 Moral patiency, in turn, 
should be regarded as a sufficient condition for legal protection against wrongs, even if the 
creatures in question cannot be held morally or legally responsible for their own actions.
Overlooking the distinction between the moral agency of an average human being 
and the moral patiency of an average vertebrate animal underlies an all­too­frequent 
argument (stemming from the Kantian tradition) that animals cannot have rights 
because they are incapable of assuming obligations. Once animals are conceived as 
moral patients rather than agents, there is no basis for linking the potential ascription 
of legal rights with the corresponding obligations (whether and why legal rights ought 
to be attributed to animals and, if so, what rights to which animals is another question, 
though). Additionally, only some interests-rights (aspects of well-being protected in 
the form of a subjective legal right) would be beneficial for animals, while most choice- 
­rights (those that allow human agents to trigger deliberate legal effects that they intend 
to bring about) would be of no use to them.
Thus, there is a remarkable gap between the human-like and a potential animal-like 
personhood (as a right-holding capacity). Arguably, it is of principally different nature 
than the distinction between natural and juristic (corporate) persons; therefore the 
argument that there are already “non­human” persons in law seems to be rather mis­
conceived in the context of animal personhood.23
The gap between human and animal capabilities of agency and the kind of right­ 
­holding should not be diminished even if in the past it has greatly overshadowed the 
even more important gap between all sentient creatures and the rest of nature. There 
can be no doubt that the emergence of sentience in the course of evolutionary history 
of life on Earth was and remains ethically the most significant breakthrough, giving 
rise to subjects whose existence may be subjectively better or worse, without which no 
choices could have any moral bearing. In other words, there is not only one, but two 
important moral divides that should be recognized and reflected in the law.
The first is sentience – it begets subjective interests emerging from the capability of 
experiencing one’s existence as composed of positive and negative stimuli. Essential eth­
ical implications of such subjective interests are obvious.24 The second is moral agency 
that underpins moral duties and responsibilities. It also makes it plausible to endow the 
agent with rights, while the awareness of those rights permits the individual to deliber­
ately operate in his or her social environment. Animals, as moral patients, have interests 
that should be recognized and respected by the law, but there is no point in granting 
them at least those personal rights that are of no benefit for one who is incapable of 
relying on them while planning one’s actions and shaping relationships with others.25 
The only point of ascribing such a bring “legal rights” is to clarify the normative force 
22 See e.g.: A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Oxford 1990.
23 More on that in T. Pietrzykowski, Personhood…, p. 31ff.
24 Ch. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures. Our Obligations to Other Animals, Oxford 2018, p. 16. See also: A. Elzanowski, 
Individual Interests, in: M. Bekoff, C. Meaney (eds.),  Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 
Westport 1998, pp. 311–313. 
25 N. Hoerster, Haben Tiere eine Würde? Grundfragen der Tierethik [Eng. Do Animals Have Dignity? Fundamental 
Questions of Animal Ethics], München 2004, 95ff. 
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of the duty that moral agents should be subjected to of respecting the vital interests of 
each and every individual moral patient.26
4.3. Dignity and degrees
An alternative option that could be taken into account when discussing how the con­
cept of dignity could be adapted to the situation of animals is to turn that concept into 
one that admits degrees. It would make it more appropriate to capture variations in 
sentience and cognitive capabilities manifested in the animal kingdom (even if limited 
to vertebrates only). In such a case, human and non-human creatures would have dif­
ferent sorts or extents of dignity, depending on the kind of conscious phenomena that 
could be plausibly attributed to their species (or individual condition). Therefore, the 
scope of normative consequences, namely rights resulting from the dignity of a given 
creature, could substantially differ depending on bio­psychological qualities of the given 
dignity­holder. This approach has, however, two obvious drawbacks.
Firstly, it would profoundly alter the concept of dignity in comparison with how it has 
been conceived and used in modern moral and legal discourse. It is doubtful whether 
insisting on applying this particular notion with so fundamentally changed meaning 
is conceptually and practically plausible.27 Secondly, it could seriously undermine the 
basic value of the concept of dignity as applied to human beings, that is, as I mentioned 
before, guaranteeing all human beings basic equal treatment before the law. Making 
the scope and normative consequences of the inherent dignity of a creature ultimately 
dependent on one’s particular biological qualities (and thus somehow “naturalizing” 
the metaphysical notion of dignity) could easily backfire against underdeveloped human 
beings.28 In effect, it would have to be reinterpreted contrary to its essence and lose 
the key value it has in contemporary legal thinking. This is a well-known concern often 
raised by those lawyers who remain sceptical as to whether a legal theory of animal rights 
and personhood is mature enough to be practically applicable in courts or legislation.29
By way of objection to the above arguments one can claim that it is possible, in 
principle, to distinguish at least human and animal dignity. Such a distinction could 
partially solve the problems I have discussed above. Human dignity may preserve its 
integral character as a distinct quality possessed by everyone in virtue of belonging 
to the human species (I ignore here the growing difficulties resulting from technolo­
gies allowing us to blur distinctions between species30). Animal dignity may be more 
internally differentiated, admitting degrees and variations depending on species or even 
individual qualities of a given non-human creature.31
26 It is important to note that the argument above does not necessarily entail the endorsement of the will theory of rights 
as such. See: T. Pietrzykowski, From Two Conceptions of Rights to Two Kinds of Rights-Holders, in: T. Pietrzykowski, 
B. Stancioli (eds.), New Approaches to the Personhood in Law, Frankfurt am Main 2015, p. 147ff.
27 F. Zuolo, Dignity and Animals. Does it Make Sense to Apply the Concept of Dignity to all Sentient Beings?, “Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice” 2016/19, pp. 1117–1130.
28 The limits of naturalization of the concept of personhood I discussed in more detail in T. Pietrzykowski, Towards 
Modest Naturalisation of the Personhood in Law, “Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law” 
2017/32, pp. 59–72.
29 See e.g.: R. Posner, Animal Rights. Legal, Philosophical and Pragmatic Perspectives, in: C. Sunstein, M. Nussbaum 
(eds.), Animal Rights. Current Debates and New Directions, Oxford–New York 2004, p. 51ff.
30 For more see: T. Pietrzykowski, Personhood..., p. 56ff.
31 For an attempt to defend the concept of “animal dignity” along these lines see: E. Kempers, Animal Dignity and the 
Law: Potential, Problems and Possible Implications, “Liverpool Law Review” 2020/41, pp. 173–199. 
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Apart from other possible weaknesses, there is still one more important disadvan­
tage of attributing to animals their own, species­ or even individually­specific dignity. 
Following the way in which it is conceived in respect of human beings, it would probably 
lead to the outlawing of not only inflicting harm on animals, but also treating them in 
a ”demeaning” manner considered to be a violation of their dignity. Such effects are 
already manifest in Swiss animal law, where the concept of animal dignity is invoked in 
order to ban acts ridiculing animals (by means of dressing, shaving, etc.) irrespective of 
whether or not it actually makes them suffer.32
From the rational point of view, however, animals should be strictly protected from 
pain, suffering, and distress caused by human beings for unjustified reasons. But extend­
ing this protection to the case of non­harmful situations which would be considered 
humiliating or demeaning for human beings seems to demonstrate anthropomorphic 
superstition rather than the plausible scope of respecting animal interests.
5. What if not dignity? An alternative approach
An alternative starting point to constructing the philosophical base of animal protection 
law is the concept of sentience. In contrast to dignity, it can provide a scientifically and 
philosophically robust foundation for the laws protecting animals. Moreover, it allows 
for more realistic, incremental progress toward an adequate status of and respect for the 
interests of animals, without the need for deep reconsideration of the well­established 
principles of human equality and personhood.
5.1. The moral significance of sentience
The moral implications of sentience are well­recognized in both major ethical tradi­
tions, i.e. utilitarianism and Kantianism. In the case of utilitarian ethics, pains and 
pleasures constitute objective values. Therefore, all sentient creatures matter morally 
as potential subjects of inherently good or bad experiences. The fact that only human 
beings are able to recognize the ethical significance of the pain and pleasures of others 
make them bound by duty to act according to the paramount moral principle, i.e., 
maximizing overall happiness in the world (that is, all happiness experienced by all the 
creatures capable of experiencing pains and pleasures).33
For Kantianism, the rational creatures are the only members of the moral commu­
nity. Nonetheless, the leading contemporary Kantian philosopher, Christine Korsgaard, 
persuasively argues that the premises on which Kant’s moral theory has been based 
actually do not imply the irrelevance of other sentient creatures as Kant himself seemed 
to believe.34 According to the revised Kantianism proposed by Korsgaard, given their 
sentience, animals must be regarded as ends in themselves. Because they lack reason 
they cannot enact moral principles and remain incapable of moral actions. Nonetheless, 
they are part of the moral community since their good is a fully legitimate object of 
32 See: G. Bollinger, Animal Dignity Protection in Swiss Law – Status Quo and Future Perspectives, Zürich–Basel–Geneva 
2016, p. 47ff.
33 For more on utilitarianism see e.g.: A. Quinton, Utilitarian Ethics, London 1989; K. de Lazari, Point of View of the 
Universe. Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics, Oxford 2016; J.J.C. Smart, B. Williams, Utilitarianism. For and Against, 
New York 1973.
34 Ch. Korsgaard, Fellow…, p. 77ff. 
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moral concern and has to be respected by the rules binding in the kingdom of ends, 
even if the rules themselves are made and followed by rational creatures only. As far 
as reason remains the criterion of being an active legislator in the moral community, 
sentience is the criterion of who matters as an end in itself for the rules adopted in that 
community by those who can act morally.
In both major ethical traditions, sentience may be seen as the foundation of moral 
status. The capability of experiencing pain and pleasure as an evolutionary emerged way 
that some species (mainly vertebrate) developed to navigate the environment and seek 
survival and reproduction is also well-established in science. A philosophical explana­
tion of the question of how purely electro­chemical processes translate into qualitatively 
different conscious states may remain the “hard problem” of our understanding of the 
mind, but on the descriptive­explanatory level of natural science, the existence of sen­
tience, its neural basis and evolutionary origin have become an uncontroversial part of 
evolutionary biology and comparative psychology.
In view of all that, it seems fully defensible to argue that two basically different kinds 
of subjecthood should be distinguished.35 One is personhood, which is related to ration­
ality and a highly-developed reflective level of consciousness and considerable ability 
for deliberate self­management of one’s own instinctive or intuitive responses to stimuli. 
Such capability seems to remain a unique or almost unique property of human creatures 
(or extending, at best, to a few other non-human species).
The other sort of subjecthood is its non­personal variation, based solely on sen­
tience, which is widely present across the animal kingdom and embraces all vertebrate 
species as well as at least some invertebrates (such as cephalopods). Non-personal sub­
jects have their own morally relevant interests related to their ability to have subjectively 
experienced lives, which can be better or worse for them. At the same time, they remain 
principally incapable of acting morally, in the sense of being aware of moral duties and 
intentionally respecting the value of interests of others.
5.2. Kinds of subjects and the law
How could this distinction be reflected in the law? Arguably, instead of trying to shift 
the boundaries of personhood, there is a need to establish a new, third category to fill 
the space between persons and things (objects). It would be a category of non-personal 
legal subjects designed for those creatures that are sentient but not “rational” (in the 
moral sense). The underlying reason is that the adequate legal implications of the moral 
qualities of animals hardly fit the traditional concepts of natural or juristic (artificial) 
personhood. On the one hand, animals do not need (nor are suited for) typical sets of 
personal rights traditionally associated with the concept of a person. Such personhood 
is “too much” for animals. On the other hand, the existing juristic personhood is a tech­
nical device, devoid of strictly moral foundations, developed to make the law a better 
instrument for pursuing human interests (e.g. to act collectively in a cooperative and 
organized manner). In this sense, juristic personhood is “not enough” for animals, since 
the recognition of their status and interest is based essentially on moral reasons and 
aims to constrain rather than further human interests. That is why adequate animal 
protection requires a deep reconstruction of the moral foundations of the legal system, 
35 For the ethical elaboration of this distinction see: P. Singer, Practical Ethics, New York 1993.
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which up to now has been principally focused on an anthropocentric worldview, in 
which human interests are the only ones that matter and the only ones that the law 
serves to promote.
All of the above supports the view that instead of shifting the boundaries of per­
sonhood (natural or juristic), the conceptual framework of the law needs to develop 
a new kind of non-personal subjecthood fit to the specific condition of sentient, albeit 
non-rational, creatures. They should occupy a space of neither persons nor things, but 
with clear and direct recognition of their status as subjects instead of objects of law. The 
consequence of that will be to regard their individual interests as valid reasons capable 
of constraining human choices and actions, but without granting them the set of rights 
traditionally attributed to persons.
The interests of sentient animals qua non­personal subjects of law should be bal­
anced with the reasons behind the actions undertaken by legal persons. In some cases, 
the outcomes of such balancing should be entrenched in the form of explicit legal rules 
specifying what is allowed and what is prohibited in the human treatment of animals. 
All other conflicts, uncovered by such specific rules, should be decided on the basis of 
a general principle that animal interests must be duly considered and respected in all 
relevant legal (legislative, administrative, judicial) decisions. The balancing of conflict­
ing interests should be governed and solved by the procedurally well­established and 
known standards of proportionality.
In other words, the pursuit of one kind of rights or interests may be preferred 
over competing ones only if the basic conditions of the test of proportionality are met. 
Namely, compromising animal interest must be unavoidable to satisfy the competing 
interest of a human being; the method chosen to satisfy the latter makes it achievable 
at the lowest possible costs for the compromised animal interests, and finally, the rele­
vant human interests are not disproportionately trivial in comparison with the animal 
interests at stake.
Clearly, the balancing and application of proportionality standards are an essentially 
evaluative undertaking, open to a wide range of different outcomes justifiable by the 
same criteria. It is a matter of axiological and interpretive reasoning and argumentation 
with no particular result guaranteed by the factual and legal premises. But this is by no 
means an exceptional case in the practice of legal and ethical reasoning. And shifting 
the burden of seeking a proper balance between human needs and ethical concerns for 
animals to judges reviewing, from this perspective, actual exploitation practices may 
turn out to be an additional way to effectuate incremental improvements in the relevant 
legal standards. In many cases it may prove more instrumental to social change than 
occasional legislation (which is, however, by no means unimportant).
5.3. The sentience approach
This kind of sentience­based approach has some clear advantages over the dignity 
approach. Firstly, it avoids mysterious, metaphysical middle-terms and, therefore, it 
much better corresponds to the scientific grounds on which ethics and law should be 
based. Secondly, it preserves the morally important distinction between rational, moral 
persons (agents) and sentient subjects that may be (and usually are) deprived of the 
essential person­making qualities. Thus, it respects the second most important moral 
distinction – between persons and non-personal, albeit sentient, subjects – after the most 
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important one, between sentient creatures and the rest of the organic and non­organic 
world. None of these distinctions should be neglected in sound ethical and legal theories.
Thirdly, it allows for much more flexibility in the treatment of particular species (or 
even individuals) in complex situations in which conflicting interests have to be bal­
anced, reconciled and traded­off. It also leaves space for more incremental changes in 
the level of the legal protection of interests of particular species in different situations. 
This, in turn, makes it better suited for the realistic claims of much faster, but still evo­
lutionary, improvements of legal systems in respect to the treatment of animals. The 
extent to which human law at a given moment would give priority to animal interests 
when these are in conflict with various well­established human exploitative practices 
may much more accurately correspond to the actually prevalent attitudes. The law 
may try to implement changes but cannot become too far detached from the real social 
background of the legal rules and practices.
The last difference mentioned above is at the same time the most important weak­
ness and peril relating to the sentience approach. Introducing the “weaker” category 
of non­personal subjects of law constructed along the lines sketched above may rel­
atively easily become downplayed in legal practice so that no substantial progress in the 
humane treatment of animals will be obtained. This risk, however, is strictly interwoven 
with the role that the law plays and is able to play in changing social attitudes. It should 
not be underestimated – the appropriate content of the law is usually a necessary con­
dition to soliciting such changes. But it must not be overestimated either.36 The law, 
by itself, is incapable of miraculously converting people’s minds, habits and consciences. 
It may – to some extent – help to stimulate such changes but they have to be driven 
principally by other social and cultural forces. Therefore, the law should be, above all, 
open and flexible enough not to inhibit such changes. In case of animal status, it may 
also support the reframing social perception of animals as subjects having their own 
legitimate interests rather than objects of property and discretionary power of their 
human “owners”. But to expect more from the law may reveal a naive faith in the 
omnipotence of an institutional level of reality that is more a reflection than a source 
of deeper social and cultural evolutions.
In view of the limited capabilities for change elicited solely by legal reforms, it is 
better to seek legal solutions that will be open and opportune to extra­legal social 
progress, as well as flexible enough to seamlessly accommodate changes in community 
attitudes. The idea of sentient animals as non­personal subjects of law seems to meet 
these conditions much better than do attempts to attribute to them personhood based 
on their own dignity.
6. Conclusion: toward proper constitutionalization of the animal status
The distinction between objects, subjects and persons should be reflected in the law 
while its proper theoretical formulation and practical implementation might well be 
the main challenge to the moral development of the law in the decades to come. After 
36 See e.g.: D. Mandeleker, The Role of Law in Social Change, “Osgoode Hall Law Journal” 1970/2, pp. 355–363; 
T. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, “New York University Law Review” 
1997/5, pp. 967–991. See also: A. Podgórecki, Socjologiczna teoria prawa [Eng. Sociological Theory of Law], Warszawa 
1998. On the relations between law and society see generally B. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and 
Society, New York 2001.
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recognition of the personhood of each human being, the next step is to adequately 
address the huge gap between the relatively well­designed basic protections of human 
beings and the faulty legal protection of animals based on poorly elaborated theoreti­
cal foundations. Up to now, animal interests have been the legal constraints to human 
prodigality to a very limited extent. Such constraints take the form of the specific anti­
­cruelty provisions of animal welfare laws. Sometimes the law even declares that ani­
mals, as a matter of principle, should not be regarded as objects (property). These so­
­called “dereificatory” clauses in statutes have been introduced in several national legal 
systems, such as German,37 Polish,38 and French.39 The position has been also adopted 
on the level of the European Union treaties (at present, in Article 13 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU), recognizing animals as “sentient creatures”.40
There is, however, no single example of a legal system in which animals are granted 
a clear status as a subject of legally valid interests that should be mandatorily taken 
into consideration in all the decisions that may adversely affect them. As a tacit, moral 
premise this is, nonetheless, present in many actual legal reasonings concerning the 
limits of the legitimate use of animals. However, there is hardly an adequate and suffi­
cient conceptual framework by means of which the changing moral attitudes to animals 
could be captured by the law. That is at least partially why it is so difficult for lawmakers 
to make a step beyond the detailed regulations typical for traditional anti-cruelty laws 
toward setting forth a new status of sentient animals that would impose some executa­
ble, general duties on legal agents.
There is a social pressure and a perceived need to find such a general normative 
solution removing animals from the category of mere objects (property). It is manifested 
by the growing number of dereificatory clauses as well as the ever­stronger rhetoric 
of some judicial decisions (such as in the famous recent Argentinian cases of judges 
liberating two chimps, Sandra and Cecilia). But the theoretical basis for the new status 
of animals is still to be worked out and without providing sound and robust conceptual 
foundations, no substantial changes of the law should be expected. One way might be 
the dignity approach, as suggested in Article 120(2) of the Constitution of Switzerland41 
together with Article 1 of the Swiss Animal Welfare Law. It is a way which, in my opi-
nion, would lead us astray. The alternative one is to theoretically elaborate and imple­
ment a new category of non-personal subjecthood in the constitutions. Its purpose 
would be to establish a new legal status for sentient animals mandating consideration 
of their interests in all decisions relevant to their individual well­being.
In order to make such a change effective for not only judicial or administrative, but 
also legislative decisions, it should be given a constitutional status. Present constitutions 
hardly ever mention animals at all and, if they do, it is usually a reference to either 
anti­cruelty legislation or specifying animals as part of the environment that should be 
protected.42 Generally, most of them remain rather timid and inconsequential. Even in 
the most promising cases, they seem at best incomplete. An example of such a promising, 
37 Article 9a of the German Civil Code (German title: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), 2.01.2002 (BGBl. I S. 42).
38 Article 1 of the Animal Welfare Act (Polish title: Ustawa z  21.08.1997 r. o  ochronie zwierząt, tekst jedn.: 
Dz. U. z 2020 r. poz. 638).
39 Article 515–14 of French Civil Code (French title: Code Civil), 16.02.2015 (Jorf 0040–2015).
40 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 47–390).
41 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 1999 (German title: Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen 
Eidgenossenschaft), 18.04.1999 (AS 1999 2556).
42 For more see: O. Le Bot, Droit Constitutionnel de l’Animal [Eng. Constitutional Animal Rights], Paris 2018.
81Against Dignity: An Argument for a Non‑Metaphysical Foundationof Animal Law  
albeit incomplete, mention is Article 9(6) of the Constitution of the Land of Salzburg.43 
It stipulates that the tasks and objectives of the public actions to be taken by the author­
ities include the respect for and protection of animals as fellow­creatures of men, who 
bear responsibility for all living creatures.
The wording of this provision goes in the right direction although as long as it lacks 
a robust and full-fledged conceptual and theoretical background, it is bound to remain 
only a half-empty ideological declaration. It also goes too far as it does not refer to sen­
tience as the basis of the duty of human beings to their fellow­creatures.
These gaps seem to have been avoided in the draft amendment to the Finnish 
Constitution proposed by the Finnish Animal Rights Law Society. Section 1 thereof 
sets forth that “animals are sentient beings and must be respected by humans”, while 
Section 2 provides that “the interests and individual needs of animals must be taken into 
account in all decision-making that has a significant impact on their living conditions”. 44
This certainly captures the central idea advocated here, although instead of limiting 
it to sentient animals, it mandates that all animals should be presumed sentient as long 
as there is no scientific evidence to the contrary. This approach seems untenable since 
there are millions of simple, invertebrate organisms where no sufficient direct evidence 
exists to the effect of their lack of sentience (simply because they have not been specifi­
cally studied), although there is not the slightest evidence of their sentience either. It is 
practically impossible to treat them, even tentatively, as sentient. Thus, unless the pro­
posed wording is not limited to vertebrate animals, it could be much stronger if Section 
1 stipulated instead that sentient animals are subjects of law, whose interests deserve 
legal recognition and respect, pursuant to the further regulations of the constitution 
and the subsequent legislation. Nonetheless, the Finnish bill remains at the moment 
the best attempt to translate into legal language the sentience­based approach to the 
fundamental reform of animal status in the law.
Against Dignity: An Argument for a Non-Metaphysical Foundation of Animal Law
Abstract: Animal protection as an emerging field of legislation needs to be constitutionalized as 
well as comprehensively expounded by legal scholars. As it is a growing body of regulation and 
accompanying legal theories, it needs to develop a solid conceptual and axiological framework, 
in particular a set of basic values and principles on which detailed rules are to be founded. 
Lacking these, the domain of animal law is still in the pre-paradigm stage and remains an 
assemblage of dispersed ideas, concepts and regulatory measures. It yet has to develop into 
a coherent whole that may grow to be a mature regulatory and doctrinal domain of the law. In 
order to reach this stage, it should be founded on clear theoretical and constitutional grounds. 
Lacking those, its further development, and effective operation may be seriously impeded. 
There seem to be two basic approaches that may serve as the possible foundations for a viable 
model of animal protection law. The first may be referred to as the “dignity” approach and the 
other, as the “sentientist” approach. According to the first of those two approaches, animal 
protection law should rely on the concept of animal dignity as its philosophical foundation. 
The second approach rejects the idea that the concept of animal dignity as the basis for 
the relevant legislation as philosophically dubious and entailing objectionable normative 
43 Constitution of the Land of Salzburg of 1999 (German title: Landes-Verfassungsgesetz), (LGBI Nr 25/1999).
44 Finnish Animal Rights Law Society, Proposal: Fundamental Rights for Animals, elaintenvuoro.fi, https://www.
elaintenvuoro.fi/english/, accessed on: 28 May 2019.
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consequences for the scope and content of legal protections of animals. Thus, it aims rather 
at legal norms and policies being based directly on scientifically informed theories of sentience, 
evolutionarily developed nervous structures underlying cognitive and emotional capabilities 
or species­typical biological and psychological needs that condition the subjective well­being 
of a given creature. The aim of this paper is to analyse and discuss both these approaches and 
to argue that the former is philosophically, conceptually and practically flawed. The second 
approach, even despite some serious disadvantages, is therefore deemed to be preferable and 
more promising.
Keywords: animals, dignity, rights, law, constitution, ethics
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